We define the notion of a canonical Gödel system in the framework of single-conclusion hypersequent calculi. A corresponding general (nondeterministic) Gödel valuation semantics is developed, as well as a (non-deterministic) linear intuitionistic Kripke-frames semantics. We show that every canonical Gödel system induces a class of Gödel valuations (and of Kripke frames) for which it is strongly sound and complete. The semantics is used to identify the canonical systems that enjoy (strong) cut-admissibility, and to provide a decision procedure for these systems. The results of this paper characterize, both proof-theoretically and semantically, a large family of (non-deterministic) connectives that can be added to propositional Gödel logic.
Introduction
Fuzzy logics is a vast field of research with numerous applications. The main idea behind the development of fuzzy logic is that in many cases propositions do not have a crisp truth value. Fuzzy logics usually try to solve this problem by allowing the whole range of numbers between 0 and 1 to serve as potential "truth values" for propositions. By this they strongly deviate from classical logic, which employs just the two extreme values: 0 and 1. However, current fuzzy logics are still orthodox (deterministic) many-valued logics, and all of them are based on the principle of truth-functionality: the truth-value of a compound formula is uniquely determined by the truth-values of its subformulas. Thus in the standard logical formalization of Zadeh's theory (see Hájek's monograph [6] ) the conjunction and implication connectives are respectively interpreted by some (left-)continuous t-norm on the interval [0, 1] and its residuum. Accordingly, the phenomenon of fuzziness is limited in these theories to atomic formulas, but no fuzziness is allowed in the semantics of connectives: an interpretation of an n-ary connective is always a crisp n-ary function on the interval [0, 1] . This fact leads to many counter-intuitive results. Thus if two formulas get by chance the same truth value (0.7, say), then they will be treated as absolutely equivalent, even if there is little connection between them (e.g. one says that John is tall, the other says that Mary is young). Moreover: given any two formulas ϕ and ψ, either ϕ → ψ or ψ → ϕ is absolutely true (i.e. it is assigned the classical truth-value 1), no matter how relevant one is to the other.
One possible direction for solving this problem is to relax the truth-functionality principle. This led to the introduction (in [3] ) of non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices) -a natural generalization of ordinary multi-valued matrices, in which the truthvalue of a complex formula can be chosen nondeterministically out of some non-empty set of options.
In this paper we provide a first step towards a theory of non-deterministic semantics for fuzzy logics. We choose the framework of Gödel logic, and characterize a large set of non-deterministic connectives that can be added to the usual connectives used in Gödel logic. Gödel logic is probably the most important intermediate logic (i.e. a logic between intuitionistic logic and classical logic), which turns up in several places. Recently it has again attracted a lot of attention because of its recognition as one of the three most basic fuzzy logics [6] .
A natural question now is how exactly a new connective is defined? While there is more than one way to address this issue, we follow the prooftheoretic approach, according to which the meaning of a connective is determined by the introduction and elimination rules which are associated with it (see e.g. [8] for discussions and references). Here one usually has in mind a deduction system of an ideal type, where each connective has its own introduction and elimination rules, and these rules should meet the following conditions: in a rule for some connective this connective should be mentioned exactly once, and no other connective should be involved. This approach was applied in [3] to characterize the set of semi-classical connectives, and in [4] to characterize the set of basic constructive connectives. However, these papers deal with (single-conclusion or multiple-conclusion) sequent system, while the most useful proof-theoretical framework for fuzzy logics is that of hypersequent systems (see [5] and [7] ). In particular, the only known system for Gödel logic, which is of the 'ideal' type described above, is the hypersequential system HG (introduced in [1] ), which has exactly the same logical rules as the usual Gentzen-type system for propositional intuitionistic logic. Thus we use the framework of hypersequential calculi to provide a proof-theoretic characterization of (deterministic and non-deterministic) connectives in Gödel logic. This characterization is accompanied (in sections 4 and 5) by semantic characterizations. Two kinds of semantic characterizations are provided: a many-valued semantics -by generalizing Gödel valuations, and a Kripkestyle semantics -by generalizing linear intuitionistic Kripke-frames. The latter is also used to prove a strong cut-admissibility theorem for the family of hypersequent systems we introduce, and to provide a decision procedure for all the logics induced by the systems of this family. The equivalence between the two types of semantics is established in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In what follows L is a propositional language, and Frm L is its set of wffs. We assume that the atomic formulas of L are p 1 , p 2 , . . . .
Definition 1.
A sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ E where Γ and E are finite sets of formulas, and E is either a singleton or empty. A sequent of the form Γ ⇒ {ϕ} is called definite. A sequent of the form Γ ⇒ ∅ is called negative. A clause is a sequent which consists of atomic formulas only.
Definition 2.
A hypersequent is a finite set of sequents.
We shall use the usual hypersequent notation s 1 | . . . | s n instead of {s 1 , . . . , s n }. We also employ the standard abbreviations, e.g. Γ, ψ ⇒ E instead of Γ ∪ {ψ} ⇒ E, and H | s instead of H ∪ {s}.
Given a set H of hypersequents, we denote by frm[H] the set of formulas that appear in H.
. A substitution is extended to sets of formulas in the obvious way:
Canonical Gödel Systems
The following definitions formulate in exact terms the structure of hypersequent rules that are used to characterize (non-deterministic) connectives in Gödel logic. These definitions are the hypersequent versions of Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 in [4] . The reader is referred to [4] for more details.
Definition 4.

A single-conclusion canonical right introduc-
tion rule for a connective of arity n is an expression of the form:
where S is a finite set of clauses over
where H is an arbitrary hypersequent, Γ is a finite set of formulas, and σ is an L-substitution.
A single-conclusion canonical left introduction
rule for a connective of arity n is an expression of the form:
where S 1 is a finite set of clauses over {p 1 , . . . , p n }, and S 2 is a finite set of negative clauses over
, where H is an arbitrary hypersequent, Γ ⇒ E is an arbitrary sequent, and σ is an L-substitution.
Convention: From now on, by "right (left) rule"
we shall mean "single-conclusion canonical right (left) introduction rule".
Example 5. The two usual rules for implication are:
Applications of these rules have the form:
The communication rule allows the following derivations:
We denote by G the syntactic consequence relation between hypersequents induced by a canonical Gödel system G (i.e. H G H iff there exists a derivation in G of the hypersequent H from the set of hypersequents H).
Definition 10. Let G be a canonical Gödel system, H ∪ {H} be a set of hypersequents, and F be a set of formulas.
A proof in G of H from H is called a F-proof
if the cut-formula of every cut in the proof is a formula from F.
We say that G enjoys strong cut-admissibility if
The property of strong cut-admissibility is crucial to ensure that a set of rules for a connective can be seen as a definition of the connective (see [4] ). In the sequel we prove that the following condition of coherence (defined exactly as in [4] ) characterizes strong cut-admissibility in canonical Gödel systems. Definition 11.
1. A set R of canonical rules for an n-ary connective is called coherent if S ∪ S 1 ∪ S 2 is classically inconsistent whenever R contains both S/ ⇒ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and
if for each connective , the set of rules in G for is coherent.
Note that every connective that was introduced in the examples above has a coherent set of rules.
Many-Valued Semantics
In this section we generalize many-valued semantics for Gödel logic to arbitrary coherent canonical Gödel systems. For this we introduce nondeterministic Gödel valuations.
• For every finite set of formulas Γ, • Let r = S/s be a right rule for an n-ary connec-
is G-legal iff it respects the canonical rules of G.
Example 15 (Implication). Let
for every ϕ and ψ. The two conditions together imply the well-known Gödel semantics:
Example 16 (Semi-Implication). Let V = V, ≤, u be an L-Gödel valuation. V respects the rule (⇒ ;) iff u(ϕ ; ψ) ≥ u(ψ) for every ϕ and ψ. V respects the rule (;⇒) iff u(ϕ ; ψ) ≤ u(ϕ) → u(ψ) for every ϕ and ψ. Together we obtain the following non-deterministic semantics:
Example 17 (Asterisk). Let V = V, ≤, u be an L-Gödel valuation. V respects the rule (⇒ * ) iff u(ϕ * ψ) ≥ min{u(ϕ), u(ψ)} for every ϕ and ψ. V respects the rule ( * ⇒) iff u(ϕ * ψ) ≤ max{u(ϕ), u(ψ)} for every ϕ and ψ. Together we obtain the following non-deterministic semantics:
The semantic meaning of the coherence criterion is formulated in the next proposition.
Proposition 18. Let G be a canonical Gödel system (for L), and V
= V, ≤, u be a G-legal L- Gödel valuation. Let S/ ⇒ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and S 1 , S 2 / (p 1 , .
. . , p n ) ⇒ be a right and a left rule for an n-ary connective . If G is coherent, then for every
). We prove that v satisfies every clause in S ∪ S 1 ∪ S 2 , and so G is not coherent.
Let
This implies that u min (σ(Π)) ≤ u max (σ(E)). It follows that u min (σ(Π)) ≤ N V (σ(S 2 )), and so there exists some
). This implies that there exists some p ∈ Π such that u(σ(p)) ≤ N V (σ(S 2 )), and so v(p) = f . Again v classically satisfies s.
Next we define the many-valued semantic consequence relation between hypersequents which is induced by a canonical Gödel system. Definition 19.
Let
a model of one of its components. It is a model of a set H of hypersequents if it is a model of every H ∈ H.
2. Let G be a canonical Gödel system, and let H ∪ {H} be a set of hypersequents. H G H iff every G-legal L-Gödel valuation which is a model of H is also a model of H.
In general, in order for a denotational semantics of a propositional logic to be useful and effective, it should be analytic. This means that to determine whether a hypersequent H follows from a set of hypersequents H, it suffices to consider partial valuations, defined on the set of all subformulas of the formulas in H ∪ {H}. Now we show that the semantics of G-legal L-Gödel valuations is analytic in this sense.
Definition 20. Let U be a set of formulas closed under subformulas. A U-Gödel semivaluation is a tuple V = V, ≤, u , where V, ≤ are defined as in Definition 12, and u is a function from U to V .
Note that an L-Gödel valuation is obtained by choosing U = Frm L . Definition 13 is applied for semivaluations without any changes. Definition 14 is modified as follows:
1. Let r = S/s be a right rule for an n-ary connec- ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ) is defined. 3. Let G be a canonical Gödel system (for L). V is G-legal iff it respects the canonical rules of G.
Theorem 22 (Analyticity). Let G be a coherent canonical Gödel system for L. The semantics of G-legal Gödel valuations is analytic in the following sense: For every set U of formulas closed under subformulas, if
Proof. Let U be a set of formulas closed under subformulas, and let V = V, ≤, u be a G-legal UGödel semivaluation. We recursively extend u to a total function u . For atomic p we let u (p) = u(p) if u(p) is defined, and u (p) = 1 (say) otherwise. For ϕ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) we let u (ϕ) = u(ϕ) whenever u(ϕ) is defined, and otherwise we define
where R denotes the set of right rules for in G. Note that the value of D V (σ ψ1,...,ψn (S)) depends only on the values assigned by u to ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n , so the recursion works, and u is well defined.
From the definition of u , it immediately follows that u is an extension of u. It remains to show that V = V, ≤, u is G-legal, i.e. that V respects the rules of G.
Let r = S/ ⇒ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) be a right rule for an n-ary connective , and let σ be an L-substitution. If u(σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ))) is defined, then since U is closed under subformulas, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, u(σ(p i )) is defined. In this case, our construction ensures that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have u (σ(p i )) = u(σ(p i )), and it easily follows that D V (σ(S)) = D V (σ(S)). Since V respects r, u ( (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ) ≥ D V (σ(S)), and so u ( (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n )) ≥ D V (σ(S)). Assume now that u(σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ))) is not defined, and so u (σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ) 
. . , p n ) be a left rule for an n-ary connective , and let σ be an L-substitution. As for the right rules, if u(σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ))) is defined, then since U is closed under subformulas and V is G-legal, it follows that
Assume now that u(σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ))) is not defined, and so u (σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n ))) = max B, where
, and so V respects r.
It remains to prove soundness and completeness of the semantics of G-legal Gödel valuations. We shall return to this in Section 6.
Kripke-style Semantics
It is well-known that Gödel logic is also characterized as the logic of linear intuitionistic Kripke frames. In this section we generalize this semantics to arbitrary coherent canonical Gödel systems. We prove that every coherent canonical Gödel system induces a set of non-deterministic linear Kripkeframes for which it is sound and complete. The semantics is then used to show that every coherent canonical Gödel system enjoys strong cutadmissibility.
The following definitions are "the linear version" of the general intuitionistic-like Kripke semantics presented in [4] for arbitrary coherent canonical sequent systems. The reader is referred to [4] for more details.
Definition 23. Let W, ≤ be a nonempty partially ordered set. Let U be a set of formulas. A function
Definition 24. Let U be a set of formulas closed under subformulas. A U-Gödel semiframe is a triple W = W, ≤, v such that:
Definition 25. Let W = W, ≤, v be a U-Gödel semiframe.
1. A sequent Γ ⇒ E is locally true in a ∈ W iff Γ ∪ E ⊆ U, and either v(a, ψ) = f for some ψ ∈ Γ, or E = {ϕ} and v(a, ϕ) = t. 2. A sequent is true in a ∈ W iff it is locally true in every b ≥ a.
Definition 26. Let W = W, ≤, v be a U-Gödel semiframe.
1. An L-substitution σ (locally) satisfies a sequent Γ ⇒ E in a ∈ W if σ(Γ) ⇒ σ(E) is (locally) true in a. 2. An L-substitution fulfils a right rule S/s in a ∈ W if it satisfies in a every clause in S. 3. An L-substitution fulfils a left rule S 1 , S 2 /s in a ∈ W if it satisfies in a every clause in S 1 , and locally satisfies in a every clause in S 2 . 4. Let r be a canonical rule for an n-ary connective . W respects r = S/s or r = S 1 , S 2 /s if for every a ∈ W and every substitution σ: if σ fulfils r in a and σ ( (p 1 , . . . , p n )) ∈ U then σ locally satisfies s in a. 5. Let G be a canonical Gödel system. W is Glegal iff it respects the canonical rules of G. Example 28 (Semi-Implication). An L-Gödel frame W = W, ≤, v respects the rule (;⇒) under the same conditions it respects (⊃⇒). W respects (⇒;) iff for every a ∈ W , v(a, ϕ ; ψ) = t whenever v(a, ψ) = t (recall that this is equivalent to v(b, ψ) = t for every b ≥ a). Note that in this case the two rules for ; do not always determine the value assigned to ϕ ; ψ: if v(a, ψ) = f , and there
Example 27 (Implication
